A Mikey le encantaba pasar la aspiradora. Tenía una aspiradora de esas de mano que le había comprado su mamá. Todos los días ayudaba a su mamá al pasar la aspiradora por toda la casa. La pasaba por la alfombra, por las cortinas, por el sofá, y hasta trataba de pasársela al gato. Un día llegó a la casa su mamá con una aspiradora nuevecita. Era grande, resplandeciente y de su mamá, no de él, le dijo su mamá. No la debía tocar. Mikey prometió obedecer. Levantó su pequeña aspiradora y empezó a pasarla por toda la casa, incluyendo el gato, pero ya no le satisfacía su pequeña aspiradora de mano. A escondidas se le acercó a la aspiradora nueva de su mamá y la encendió.

De repente arrancó la aspiradora como si estuviera endemoniada. Desapareció todo el polvo de la alfombra, de las cortinas y del sofá e incluso desapareció el gato. La aspiradora empezó a tragarse todo la casa. Se tragó la oficina con todo y lápices y plumas, la cocina con todo y utensilios, las escaleras, el pasillo y el comedor con todo y mesa. Se tragó la ducha, el lavamanos y la basura, pero no el apeste. Se tragó la cómoda, la camá, el sofá y hasta al tío de Mikey que acostado en él estaba. Se tragó al vendedor de aspiradoras que tocó a la puerta. Se tragó al vecino, a sus hijos y a su esposa. Se tragó el buzón del correo y luego la casa entera. En eso llegó la mamá de Mikey reclamándole y la aspiradora se la tragó a ella también, con un gruñido espantoso.

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Facts

Griswold, an Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood of Connecticut and a medical doctor were convicted under a state statute criminalizing of married couples seeking to take contraceptives.

Issue

Is there a right to privacy in marriage implicit in the Constitution, despite the lack of explicit language guaranteeing such a right?

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Brest

Christopher Hurtado —  February 9, 2010

Original understanding refers to the philosophy of adjudication that considers the Constitution and the notions of its adopters are binding. The intent of this philosophy is the consistent interpretation of the Constitution over time. Originalism can be divided into four forms: “strict originalism” (or literalism), “strict intentionalism,” “moderate originalism” and “nonoriginalism.” The intent of the strict textualists is to interpret the text of the constitution very narrowly and precisely. The aim of intentionalism is to interpret the text according to the intent of the framers and adopters of the Constitution. The more common “moderate originalism” holds the text of the Constitution as authoritative, but open to interpretation according to the general purpose of the adopters. Nonoriginalist interpretation views the original history of the Constitution as grounds for inference of the appropriate interpretation, while at the same time leaving it open to revision or valid objection, and even forfeiture or annulment, according to changing experiences and perceptions.

Textualism assumes that (a) only a written text can impose constitutional obligations, or (b) that the adopters of the Constitution intended it to be interpreted according to strict textualism, or (c) that the text is the surest way to ensure the correct interpretation of the intent of the adopters. Intentionalists, on the other hand, view the Constitution as a useful guide to determining the intent of its adopters, but do not accord it favored status over other sources.

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Same-sex Marriage

Christopher Hurtado —  February 4, 2010

Those who argue against the proposition that same-sex marriage should be legal believe homosexuality a matter of choice and an immoral one at that. They also argue that homosexuals are not a disadvantaged group when compared to blacks. Thus, they argue, homosexuals do not need or deserve special protection from the government since they can protect themselves by hiding their sexual orientation. Those who argue in favor of same-sex marriage counter that demanding that homosexuals hide their sexual orientation while heterosexuals is discriminatory.

 

Those who argue in favor of the proposition that same-sex marriage should be legal believe that homosexuality should be protected against discrimination just as religion is, since, they argue, homosexuality, like religion, is a choice. They argue that just as people are not expected to hide their religion, but rather are protected in their choice, homosexuals should not be expected to hide their sexual orientation, but rather should be protected in their choice also. Those who argue against the proposition that same-sex marriage should be legal counter that many religious groups are not disadvantaged. In fact, like many homosexuals, they are advantaged when compared to blacks. Furthermore, religion is explicitly protected by the constitution,whereas homosexuality is not. Furthermore, they argue, some homosexual acts violated laws that have been found to be constitutional.

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MacKinnon points out that traditional equality is based on an Aristotelian notion of equality – the treatment of likes alike and unlikes unalike. She then argues that the Aristotelian notion of equality fails to recognize that the subordination of groups and the existing hierarchy in a society results in the perception of differences as natural. In MacKinnon’s view, the opposite of equality is a hierarchical social construct, not difference. Therefore, she argues for the dismantlement of group hierarchy and the promotion of equality of status for historically subordinated groups. She proposes equality jurisprudence that defines sex equality under the law as opposed to traditional notions of equality, which she views as abstract.

I agree in principle with MacKinnon’s substantive approach to the jurisprudence of sex equality under the law. However, I fundamentally disagree with her notion that the only way to promote equality of status for historically subordinated groups is to dismantle group hierarchy. If the existing hierarchy in society does, in fact, result in the perception of differences as natural, then MacKinnon and others who may agree with her ought to be able to demonstrate it within the existing group hierarchy. If they cannot demonstrate it, then they cannot reasonably expect to succeed in overturning common law. As a negative cannot be proven, it is up to MacKinnon and her followers to prove the claim they make against the current situation.

Autobiografía

Christopher Hurtado —  January 29, 2010

Christopher Hurtado es un empresario autodidacta con una ardiente pasión por la tecnología, los idiomas, el aprendizaje y la enseñanza. Tiene más de veintidós años de experiencia en traducción, enseñanza de idiomas y entrenamiento de cruce cultural. Ha enseñado inglés para hispanoparlantes, así como español y árabe para angloparlantes. Es coautor de Vacation Spanish: A Survival Guide for Mexico, the Caribbean, Central & South America (el cual incluye un capítulo sobre el portugués de Brasil). Está está haciendo una doble carrera en estudios medio-orientales y árabe, y en filosfía en la Brigham Young University. Se gradúa en abril de 2010.

 

Desde que fundó Linguistic Solutions en 1991, Hurtado ha estado utilizando metodologías de alta tecnología y alto contacto para manejar relaciones con clientes, proyectos de traducción y una red global de traductores independientes al servicio de una variedad de clientes a nivel internacional, incluyendo compañías Fortune 500 y nuevas empresas de alta tecnología. Linguistic Solutions derriba barreras idiomáticas y culturales a través de la traducción, la interpretación, la enseñanza de idiomas extranjeros y el entrenamiento de cruce cultural.

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Facts

This case consolidates several different cases from Delaware, Kansas, South Carolina, and Virginia. Several black children sought, through legal representation, admission to public schools that allowed or required racial segregation. The plaintiffs alleged that racial segregation was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

A three-judge federal district court denied the plaintiffs relief under the “separate but equal” doctrine in all but one case, citing Plessy v. Ferguson. The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that segregated schools were not equal and could not be made equal and that the plaintiffs were therefore deprived of equal protection of the laws.

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Is there a moral obligation to obey the law?

Is it immoral to ever disobey any particular law no matter what the law or reasons? It seems it depends on the law, the situation and one’s reasons. When considering whether we have an obligation to obey the law, some would answer that it depends on what is meant by “law.” By law do we mean moral law or man-made law? Martin Luther King, Jr., a premier example of civil disobedience in our day, wrote in a letter to his fellow clergyman from jail in Birmingham regarding unjust man-made law that “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” According to Augustine, an unjust man- made law is really no law at all. While there seems to be a legal and moral responsibility to obey just laws in this view, there also seems to be a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. Just law can be understood as man-made code that is consistent with moral law, whereas unjust law can be understood as human law not rooted in eternal and natural law.

Others, like Mill would answer by appealing to the principle of utility. In his view, the law does not add anything to the morality of the situation. There is no moral obligation to obey the law. It is the consequences that matter. The question then becomes, are the consequences of my disobedience good overall, or are they harmful? Kant would ask, what if everyone did it? His categorical imperative claims that if one can will one’s maxim to be universal law without contradiction, then one’s maxim is moral and one must act on it. Otherwise, it is not moral and one must refrain from acting on it.

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Dworkin

Christopher Hurtado —  January 19, 2010

Dworkin’s main objection to Hart’s positivism is that the law ought to “take rights seriously.” If Hart’s claim that the adjudication of a hard case rests upon a judge’s personal opinion, intuition or his exercise of strong discretion, then rights are seriously compromised. In Dworkin’s view, rights are more important than other considerations such community welfare. Rights must not be subordinated to the interest of the community. They must be recognized as a part of the law. Dworkin argues that history provides more support for individual rights and liberty than legal positivism does.

 

In Lost Empire, Dworkin attacks conventionalism and pragmatism. According to conventionalism, law is a function of social convention-cum-legal convention. In other words, law simply consists in following convention. In this view, judges may exercise strong discretion in adjudicating. Continue Reading…

Rules? What Rules?

Christopher Hurtado —  January 15, 2010

Introduction

Strawson argued that Russell conflated meaning and reference because Russell held that to be meaningful, expressions and sentences had to have a reference. Russell argued that for every meaningful piece of language there has to be a chunk of reality to which it refers, even if it is just a propositional function. Strawson asserted that the meaning of a word is not its reference, but the rules for the use of that word. Prima facie, this seems like it might work with indexicals, if not with with non-indexicals. However, I will argue that, despite the intuitive appeal of  Strawson’s theory, he is ultimately begging the question in arguing against Russell. Rules for the use of words, whether indexical or non-indexical, cannot be significantly specified without relying on Russellian reference.

Background

A perennial problem in the philosophy of language is how expressions and sentences with no reference have meaning. For example, the sentence “The king of France is wise” is meaningful even though France is no longer a monarchy. “The king of France” is the subject of the sentence. So, if the sentence is meaningful, it is about the king of France. But if France is no longer a monarchy, then what is the sentence about? Furthermore, according to Russell, if the sentence is meaningful, it must be either true or false. If the king of France is wise, then the sentence is true. If the king of France is not wise, it is false. But for the sentence to be true or false, France would have to be a monarchy. In 1905, Russell gave a theory to explain the meaning of sentences with no reference in On Denoting. In it, he proposed an answer to both of the above paradoxes.

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